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Safety Management
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Abstract
Complex industrial plants are characterized by digitalization and innovation. 
In this context it is strategic to ensure the systematic design, implementation, 
and continuous improvement of all processes (operations management). One of 
the most obvious ways to improve operations performance is to reduce the risk of 
accidents and human errors. In this pilot study the Functional Resonance Analysis 
Method (FRAM) is proposed to analyze the complexity of safety in industrial 
plants. This research integrates FRAM with Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), a 
multi criteria technique, to overcome the limits of the FRAM. The result is a pro-
posal of an alternative approach to risk assessment based on principles of resilience 
engineering. A real case study in a petrochemical company is analyzed.
Keywords: AHP, FRAM, resilience engineering, performance variability,  
human error, operations management
1. Introduction
Although over the years, industrial plants have improved their safety manage-
ment processes, it is evident that safety systems need to be further improved [1]. 
This need is underlined by the many accidents that have occurred in industrial 
plants over recent years, arising from human causes, technical causes, or natural 
causes. Traditional safety management models are designed to identify negative 
factors and develop systems to mitigate their impact. These models allow to analyze 
different critical situations, but they seem ineffective for today’s business needs [2]. 
Particularly, in modern industrial plants, only a few functions are independent of each 
other. Thus, analyzing them individually may not be the best model. In general, due 
to the complexity of the systems it is necessary to analyze all functions and tasks. In 
this perspective, Resilience Engineering (RE) is a useful approach to manage complex 
systems. This approach is a new way to think about safety and risk management [3]. 
Unlike the classic risk management approaches that are based on the analysis of a 
posteriori causes by adopting a linear cause-and-effect approach, the RE adopts a  
perspective that refers to the theory of complexity. RE aims to revise the analysis 
models to create processes that are flexible and robust. Functional Resonance 
Analysis Method (FRAM) proposed by Hollnagel defines complex systems through 
their functions and studies the interactions between these functions [4]. The main 
strength of FRAM method is based on the principle that a variation in the conditions 
in which an action takes place can lead to improvements or worsening that ultimately 
Operations Management - Emerging Trend in the Digital Era
2
lead to its success or failure. However, this approach leads to a qualitative result 
aimed at highlighting how multiple variables combined can change the outcome 
of an action in a dynamic environment. The points in favor of this method and of 
resilience engineering are evident, but they still pose obstacles, sometimes even 
technical ones to overcome.
Thus, in the present research the FRAM method is used in conjunction with 
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) to overcome the limits of the FRAM. AHP is 
a well-known multi-criteria decision support technique developed in the 1970s 
by the Prof. Thomas L. Saaty [5]. The proposed model overcomes the qualitative 
limits of the resilience engineering models proposed in the literature. The AHP 
helps to assess the subjective probability of an event or trigger cause. Furthermore, 
through the integration of the AHP it allows to evaluate the strength of relation-
ship between the variability of human performance and influence of the external 
environment. The preset study is a pilot research. The proposed process will be 
tested in other situations and industrial settings. In fact, the model is extremely 
flexible and can be applied in different scenario.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a general over-
view on resilience engineering approach and a brief state of art. Section 3 describes 
the proposed model based on FRAM and AHP. Section 4 describes a real case study 
in a petrochemical industry and its results. Finally, in Section 5 conclusion of the 
proposed “model” and the future research are summarized.
2. General overview on resilience engineering approach
Resilience Engineering (RE) is a multidisciplinary field of study dealing with 
safety in complex systems that have several interdependent elements from an 
economic, human, and social point of view [6]. RE is the intrinsic ability of a 
system to modify its functioning before, during and following a change or disrup-
tion, in order to be able to continue the necessary operations both under foreseen 
and unforeseen conditions [7]. In general, safety is defined as a condition that 
minimizes the number of negative outcomes. Thus, it is possible to understand 
the functioning of a system by analyzing its parts. Therefore, in this view the aim 
is to reduce the number of accidents by reducing their causes. This is the so-called 
Safety I. In opposition to this vision was developed Safety II. This approach not 
only focuses on adverse events, but also analyzes everyday work situations in 
which things are going well [8]. In this perspective, safety is defined positively 
as an effective daily operating situation, rather than negatively as the absence of 
accidents. Unlike the classic risk analysis and risk management approaches that are 
based on the analysis of a posteriori causes by adopting a linear cause-and-effect 
approach, the RE adopts a perspective that refers to the Theory of complexity [9]. It 
aims to revise the analysis models to create processes that are flexible and robust 
Therefore, for the RE, risk management is not aimed at reducing sources of risk, 
but at strengthening the ability to reduce the variability of performance both in 
expected and unexpected conditions [10]. In this context, Functional Resonance 
is a characteristic of a complex system that explains how serious consequences can 
arise from small variations in the performance of its parts or the environmental 
conditions in which it operates [11]. The Functional Resonance Analysis Method 
(FRAM) is a recent method developed to explore how functional variability affects 
the overall system [12]. An investigation on the SCOPUS, one of the most accredited 
databases in the scientific community (Scopus is updated periodically and offers 
around 25,000 articles from more than 5000 international publishers), pointed out 
that 47 documents have been published from 2010 to 2020. The search query used 
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on Scopus was (TITLE-ABS-KEY (resilience AND engineering) AND TITLE-
ABS-KEY (functional AND resonance AND analysis AND method)). the survey 
result includes only articles in which the string was found in 1) title, or in 2) abstract 
or in 3) key words. As can be seen from Figure 1 there is a growing interest in this 
topic. It is interesting to note that there are no publications on Scopus before 2010. 
This means that it is a new and promising topic.
A country where there is greater scientific interest is Italy (27,6%), followed 
by Brazil (17%), as it is shown in Figure 2. The publications are mostly articles 
published in international journals (63,8%) and conference paper (31,9%). 
Furthermore, the survey pointed out that most of the research is in the engineering 
area (36,3%) as shown in Figure 3.
A recent study developed by Patriarca et al. [13] highlighted that aviation is by 
far the most investigated domain with the FRAM with a percentage equal to 24,87%. 
This is not a surprising result since FRAM was developed in the aeronautical field. 
Other emerging sectors are healthcare (13,99%) and industrial operations (12,44%) 
as demonstrated by several publications [14–16]. Furthermore, some authors 
pointed out that FRAM does not assess the human behavior and the human perfor-
mance to analyze the human error [17, 18].
Other publications demonstrated how FRAM is a qualitative approach for 
accident, risk and system analysis and it does not support quantification [19–21]. 
Definitely, FRAM is a qualitative method. Furthermore, it does not support quanti-
fication. To overcome this issue, FRAM is used together with the Analytic Hierarchy 
Process (AHP). Thus, it is possible to measure the subjectivity in establishing the 
potential variability of functions as suggested by Rosa et al. [22]. The integration of 
Figure 1. 
Documents by year.
Figure 2. 
Documents by country.
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FRAM-AHP is proposed also in other two works. Both applied the hybrid to evaluate 
construction sustainability. [23, 24].
3. Materials and methods
3.1 Functional resonance analysis method (FRAM)
FRAM methodology aims to analyze how the variability of one or more functions 
can be combined between them and how to prevent their resonance, which could 
lead to unwanted results [25]. For this purpose, FRAM method studies the system 
first under normal conditions, after FRAM analyzes the variability that cause to 
the event unwanted. The aim is obviously to be able to issue recommendations that 
prevent the repetition of the event. FRAM consists of four steps: 1) Identify system 
functions; 2) Characterize the potential variability of the functions; 4) Determine 
the dependencies among functions and 4) Monitor the variability. Some more 
details about each step are provided below [26].
Step#1 “Identification of the essential functions”. The present step aims to 
identify the functions or the specific action that are needed to carry out a specific 
task [27]. Each function is described using the six aspects (as shown in Figure 4): 
INPUT (I); OUTPUT (O); TIME (T); CONTROL (C); PRECONDITIONS (P) and 
RESOURCES (R). Functions can have links to each other. They can typically have 
multiple links and dependencies. From a practical point of view, to represent the 
variability it is possible to use the FRAM Model Visualiser (FMV). FMV allow to 
build a graphical representation of a FRAM model.
Step#2 “Identification of variability”. The present step identifies the vari-
ability of functions in order to understand how functions can become coupled 
and how this can lead to unexpected outcomes [28]. The FRAM assume that there 
are characteristic differences in the variability of technological functions (T), of 
human functions (M), and of organizational functions (O).
Step#3 “Aggregation of variability and define functional resonance”. This 
step aims to analyze the variability of functions and how they interacted with each 
other [29]. The variability of a function depends on couplings among functions. 
It is not enough to evaluate the variability for the single function. It is necessary to 
Figure 3. 
Documents by subject area.
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understand how variability can be combined. This is achieved using the upstream-
downstream functional coupling. The variability of the function can be the result 
of couplings of upstream functions that influence downstream functions. Each 
upstream variable can be connected to its downstream variable using the 5 available 
inputs (showed in Figure 4). Depending on the type of connection, different vari-
ability occurs (see Table 1 as example).
Step#4 “Monitor and manage the variability”. The step aims to propose ways 
to manage the possible occurrences of uncontrolled performance variability – or 
possible conditions of functional resonance – that have been found by the preceding 
steps [30]. The purpose is to find critical combinations and reinforce the barriers. 
The problems of complex systems cannot be eliminated, eliminating the variability 
of the performances, because this is essential to ensure the reliability of the systems. 
A sensitivity analysis is performed to evaluate different solutions.
3.2 Analytic hierarchy model
The main feature of Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is to break down a 
decision-making problem in a hierarchy [31]. AHP uses a mathematical approach 
Figure 4. 
FRAM hexagon: The six aspects used to characterize functions.
Output variability of upstream function Possible effects on downstream function
Time Too early False start (V+)
Possible damping (V-)
In time Possible damping (V-)
Too late Delayed activities (V+)
Omission Start imprecision (V+)
Accuracy Inaccurate Waste of time (V+)
Acceptable No change (V=)
Accurate Possible damping (V-)
Table 1. 
Example of aggregation of functions (output – input).
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based on matrix algebra to “measure” decisions [32]. AHP is characterized by three 
main phases as described below.
Phase #1 “Define hierarchy”. The aim of the first step is to define the goal and 
the hierarchy of the decision problem. The decision maker or the experts team identi-
fies a set of criteria for evaluating the n decision alternatives and assigns a percentage 
weight to each criterion; then assigns a score that is the impact of the criterion on the 
decision. The score of each decision alternative is the weighted average of the scores 
of each criterion on the decision by the weight assigned to each criterion. The top of 
hierarchy represents the goal of the decision problem. Lower levels represent criteria 
and sub-criteria in which the decision-making model is broken down. The bottom 
level represents all alternatives to evaluate in terms of the criteria [33].
Phase #2 “Perform pairwise comparison and relative weight estimation”. 
After defining the hierarchy, the criteria are compared in pairs, the sub criteria 
and alternatives are compared in pairs by assigning a score of relative importance 
to the other. The sum of the weights must be 100%. Saaty suggested an increas-
ing scale of values form 1 (equal importance) to 9 (extreme importance) when 
comparing two components [34]. The result of the comparison is the so-called 
dominance coefficient aij that represents the relative importance of the component 
on row (i) over the component on column (j), i.e., aij = wi/wj. The pairwise com-
parisons can be represented in the form of a square matrix (n x n), symmetric 
and diagonal. The number of pairwise comparisons grows quadratically with the 
number of criteria and alternatives. The score of 1 represents equal importance 
of two components and 9 represents extreme importance of the component i 
over the component j. [35].
Phase#3 “Perform consistency index”. Saaty (1990) proposed utilizing 
consistency index (CI) to verify the consistency of the comparison matrix [36]. The 
CI could then be calculated by: CI = (λmax − n)/n − 1. In general, if CI is less than 
0.10, satisfaction of judgments may be derived. Figure 5 shows a summary of the 
main steps and phases of the study.
4. Scenario modeling: a case study on a petrochemical plant
The model was applied in a real case study concerning the management of 
an emergency in a petrochemical company (see Figure 6). The plant consists of 
Figure 5. 
Summary of the main steps and phases of the study.
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process and service plants. Plant processes include: Predistillation unit; Propane 
unit; Distillation unit; Catalytic hydrogenation unit and Diesel oil purification. 
While service facilities include: Diathermic oil system; Steam and hot water pro-
duction unit; Refinery torch; Hydrogen production unit; Cooling water system and 
Refinery storage area. The plant preserves extremely dangerous substances in quan-
tities equal to or greater than the limits. Thus, it is a plant with a high risk activity, 
where it is necessary to analyze all the deviations from the operating standards 
(emergency conditions) such as: gas leakage, hydrocarbon release, fire, earthquake, 
flood, sabotage, pollution, etc.
STEP#1 “Identification of the Essential Functions”. The case study analyzes 
the emergency generated by the loss of propane gas during the transfer from tanker 
to tank. The goal of the model was to evaluate the variability of performance 
between upstream activities and downstream activities. An expert team was 
formed. The expert team consisted of 1 safety manager, 1 AHP expert, 1 chemical 
engineer, 1 mechanical engineering and 1 risk manager. The expert team analyzed 
the scenario and summarized the main activities are carried out during emptying 
the propane from the vehicle and placing it in the treatment plant. In fact, propane 
is a very dangerous hydrocarbon as the compound appears as a colorless and odor-
less gas, which can however be easily liquefied by compression and therefore highly 
flammable. Table 2 describes the activities carried out during the emergency and 
the responsibilities.
Figure 7 shows the FRAM of the emergency management activity. FRAM Model 
Visualiser (FMV) was used to create a graphical representation of a FRAM model 
((https://functionalresonance.com/FMV/index.html).
STEP#2 “Identification of variability”. In the second step the variability of 
the functions was characterized and highlighted in red in Figure 7. In the scenario 
analysis, the human functions revealed more criticality, which could present differ-
ent variability. In particular, the analysis focused on two main activities and related 
emergency scenarios:
• Scenario A “activate ESD control”;
• Scenario B “activate hydro-foam cannon”.
Figure 6. 
Petrochemical plant.
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Figure 7. 
FRAM representation of the system.
According to the analysis, the expert team characterized the environmental 
conditions in which the operators work. Historically, human performance is investi-
gated through specific performance shaping factors (PSFs), as described below:
• PSF#1 Training and Experience. It refers to the experience and training of the 
operator(s) involved in the task.
• PSF#2 Procedures and Administrative Controls. It refers to the existence and 
use of formal operating procedures.
# Operations Responsible
1 Activate Electrostatic discharge (ESD) control from the control room to stop 
the transfer and close the cut-off valves
Desk operator
2 Activate the shower cooling system on the truck through the 10HC1V system Desk operator
3 If possible, intercept the ATB side valve Truck driver
4 Disconnect the unloading arms Internal 
operator
5 Turn away truck Internal 
operator
6 Alternatively, continue the unloading operations until the tanker is emptied, 
and the gas is depressurized
Internal 
operator
7 Activate hydro-foam cannon Internal 
operator
8 Turn off furnace and cool surrounding equipment Internal 
operator
Table 2. 
Functions of the system.
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• PSF#3 Ergonomics and Human Machine Interaction. It refers to the adequacy 
or inadequacy of machine (i.e. computer).
• PSF#4 Time Available. It refers to the adequacy or inadequacy of the time 
available to complete a task.
• PSF#5 Complexity. It refers to the difficult of the task to perform (simple, easy, 
difficult, very difficult, difficult beyond standards).
• PSF#6 Workload, Stress and Stressors. It refers to mental stress or excessive 
workload.
• PSF#7 Work Processes. It refers to the adequacy or inadequacy of safety 
culture, management policies/support, etc.
STEP#3 “Aggregation of variability and definition of functional resonance”. 
The AHP hierarchical structure created for characterizing the variability and 
define functional resonance is shown in Figure 8. AHP model was created using 
Super Decision Software (http://www.superdecisions.com/). When two items of 
the “Performance Shape Factor” level are compared with respect to the main goal, 
the expert answers the question “Which PSF is more important?”. The AHP helps to 
assess the subjective probability of an event or trigger cause.
Table 3 summarized the weights of variability in which operators are involved 
according to PSFs. The weights of the factors are defined through AHP. More 
specifically, it emerges that PSF#1, PSF#4 and PSF#6 present a higher probability 
of occurrence.
A graphic representation of Table 3 is shown in Figure 9.
Furthermore, the AHP model allows to define the probability of occurrence 
of the most critical scenario or, as the results show in Figure 10, the most critical 
scenario is scenario B: Scenario A (47%%) and Scenario B (53%).
Figure 8. 
AHP model.
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Figure 9. 
Probability of occurrence of the most critical PSFs.
STEP#4 “Monitor and manage the variability”. From the numerical analysis 
FRAM emerges a critical value (considering the values shown in table n) for the 
“activate hydro-foam cannon” function which must be analyzed to limit its vari-
ability, which affects the downstream variable. While the “Activate ESD control” 
function presents a lower variability.
Considering the most critical PSF or PSF#1 a sensitivity analysis was performed 
to evaluate the variability of this factor and the robustness of the model. As shown 
in Figure 11 it emerges that if the vertical line is at 0.5 shows the scenario A is more 
likely. For any PSFs greater than that, the Scenario B is the more likely.
The general result or PSF#1 highlights that Training and Experience is a critical 
point. It is an unsurprising result. In fact, it is clear that training is essential to taught 
PSFs Weighting of variability
PSF#1 0,29,448
PSF#2 0,14,892
PSF#3 0,04571
PSF#4 0,15,991
PSF#5 0,10,006
PSF#6 0,18,167
PSF#7 0,06925
Table 3. 
Weighting of output variability.
Figure 10. 
Probability of occurrence of the most critical scenario.
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workers to manage complex scenarios at achieving those skills that allow them to work 
both by reducing risks and protecting personal and community safety. Safety training 
is the only “measure” that can be validly opposed to situations of residual risk.
5. Conclusions
This is a pilot study that is based on the awareness that the increasingly 
complexity of industrial plants and the need to analyze safety systems lead 
researchers to develop new methodological approach. In the present research the 
main gap of the qualitative approach of FRAM method was overcome with the 
integration of a multi-criteria decision-making method. The research proposes 
the integration of the traditional FRAM method with AHP. The integration of 
AHP with FRAM allows to investigate a new perspective in the field of risk man-
agement. The model was applied in a real case study to evaluate the performance 
of emergency operations in a petrochemical company. Considering the variability 
of each system function, the research numerically shows the level of variability 
generated by an upstream function on a downstream function. The results 
obtained are aimed at identifying function couplings that could generate high 
variability. Future development of research is the integration technological and 
organizational aspects, beyond human ones. Moreover, the model can be applied 
in different socio-technical systems where a high level of complexity requires the 
use of innovative tools. Thus, the proposed model will be tested in other situa-
tions or industrial settings.
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Sensitivity analysis.
Operations Management - Emerging Trend in the Digital Era
12
Author details
Antonella Petrillo1*, Fabio De Felice2 and Laura Petrillo3
1 Department of Engineering, University of Naples “Parthenope”, Isola C4 CDN, 
80143 Naples, Italy
2 Department of Civil and Mechanical Engineering, University of Cassino and 
Southern Lazio, via G. Di Biasio, 43 03043 Cassino, Italy
3 S.C. Prevenzione e Sicurezza Ambienti di Lavoro - S.S. PSAL Porto Ponte Andrea 
Doria, 16126 Genova, Italy
*Address all correspondence to: antonella.petrillo@uniparthenope.it
© 2020 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms 
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited. 
13
The Analytic Functional Resonance Analysis to Improve Safety Management
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.93998
References
[1] Petrillo, A., Falcone, D., De Felice, 
F., Zomparelli, F. Development of a 
risk analysis model to evaluate human 
error in industrial plants and in critical 
infrastructures. International Journal of 
Disaster Risk Reduction, 2017; 23, 15-24.
[2] Mechhoud, E. A., Rouainia, 
M., Rodriguez, M. A New tool for 
risk analysis and assessment in 
petrochemical plants. Alexandria 
Engineering Journal, 2016; 55(3), 
2919-2931.
[3] Giardina, M., Morale, M. Safety 
study of an LNG regasification 
plant using an FMECA and HAZOP 
integrated methodology. Journal of Loss 
Prevention in the Process Industries, 
2015; 35, 35-45.
[4] Hollnagel, E. FRAM: The Functional 
Resonance Analysis Method: Modelling 
Complex Socio-Technical Systems. 
Ashgate, 2012.
[5] Saaty, T.L. Modeling unstructured 
decision problems - the theory of 
analytical hierarchies. Mathematics and 
Computers in Simulation, 1978; 20(3), 
pp. 147-158.
[6] Akgün, İ., Gümüşbuğa, F., Tansel, 
B. Risk based facility location by 
using fault tree analysis in disaster 
management. Omega, 2015; 52, 168-179.
[7] Righi, A. W., Saurin, T. A., & 
Wachs, P. A systematic literature review 
of resilience engineering: Research 
areas and a research agenda proposal. 
Reliability Engineering & System 
Safety, 2015; 141, 142-152.
[8] Rankin, A., Lundberg, J., Woltjer, 
R., Rollenhagen, C., & Hollnagel, E. 
Resilience in everyday operations: a 
framework for analyzing adaptations 
in high-risk work. Journal of Cognitive 
Engineering and Decision Making, 
2014; 8(1), 78-97.
[9] Hickford, A.J., Blainey, S.P., Ortega 
Hortelano, A., Pant, R. Resilience 
engineering: theory and practice in 
interdependent infrastructure systems. 
Environment Systems and Decisions, 
2018; 38(3), pp. 278-291.
[10] Bergström, J., van Winsen, R., 
Henriqson, E. On the rationale of 
resilience in the domain of safety: A 
literature review. Reliability Engineering 
& System Safety, 2015; 141, 131-141.
[11] Sawaragi, T., Horiguchi, Y., Hina, 
A. Safety analysis of systemic accidents 
triggered by performance deviation. In 
SICE-ICASE, 2006. International Joint 
Conference (pp. 1778-1781). IEEE.
[12] Furniss, D., Curzon, P., Blandford, 
A. Using FRAM beyond safety: a case 
study to explore how sociotechnical 
systems can flourish or stall. Theoretical 
Issues in Ergonomics Science; 2016; 
17(5-6), pp. 507-532.
[13] Patriarca, R., Di Gravio, G., 
Woltjer, R., (...), Ferreira, P., Hollnagel, 
E. Framing the FRAM: A literature 
review on the functional resonance 
analysis method. Safety Science, 2020; 
129,104827.
[14] Kaya, G.K., Ovali, H.F., Ozturk, F. 
Using the functional resonance analysis 
method on the drug administration 
process to assess performance variability 
Safety Science 118, pp. 835-840.
[15] Schutijser, B.C.F.M., Jongerden, 
I.P., Klopotowska, J.E., (...), de Bruijne, 
M.C., Wagner, C. Double checking 
injectable medication administration: 
Does the protocol fit clinical practice? 
Safety Science, 2019; 118, pp. 853-860.
[16] Bridges, K.E., Corballis, P.M., 
Hollnagel, E. “Failure-to-Identify” 
Hunting Incidents: A Resilience 
Engineering Approach. Human Factors, 
2018; 60(2), pp. 141-159.
Operations Management - Emerging Trend in the Digital Era
14
[17] Toroody, A.B., Abaei, M.M., 
Gholamnia, R. Conceptual compression 
discussion on a multi-linear (FTA) 
and systematic (FRAM) method in an 
offshore operation’s accident modeling 
International. Journal of Occupational 
Safety and Ergonomics, 2016; 22(4),  
pp. 532-540.
[18] Alvarenga, M.A.B., Frutuoso E 
Melo, P.F., Fonseca, R.A. A critical 
review of methods and models for 
evaluating organizational factors in 
Human Reliability Analysis Progress in 
Nuclear Energy 75, pp. 25-41
[19] Pardo-Ferreira, M.D.C., Rubio-
Romero, J.C., Gibb, A., Calero-Castro, 
S. Using functional resonance analysis 
method to understand construction 
activities for concrete structures. Safety 
Science, 2020; 128,104771
[20] Kaya, G.K., Ovali, H.F., Ozturk, F. 
Using the functional resonance analysis 
method on the drug administration 
process to assess performance 
variability. Safety Science, 2019; 118,  
pp. 835-840.
[21] Pardo-Ferreira, M.C., Martínez-
Rojas, M., Salguero-Caparrós, F., Rubio-
Romero, J.C. Evolution of the Functional 
Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) 
through the combination with other 
methods. Direccion y Organizacion, 
2019; 68, pp. 41-50.
[22] Rosa, L.V., França, J.E.M., Haddad, 
A.N., Carvalho, P.V.R. A resilience 
engineering approach for sustainable 
safety in green construction. Journal of 
Sustainable Development of Energy, 
Water and Environment Systems, 2017; 
5(4), pp. 480-495.
[23] Haddad, A.N., Rosa, L.V. 
Construction sustainability evaluation 
using AHP and FRAM methods IIE 
Annual Conference and Expo, 2015  
pp. 556-565.
[24] Rosa, L.V., Haddad, A.N., de 
Carvalho, P.V.R. Assessing risk in 
sustainable construction using the 
Functional Resonance Analysis Method 
(FRAM). Cognition, Technology and 
Work, 2015; 17(4), pp. 559-573.
[25] De Carvalho, P.V.R The use of 
Functional Resonance Analysis Method 
(FRAM) in a mid-air collision to 
understand some characteristics of 
the air traffic management system 
resilience. Reliability Engineering and 
System Safety, 2011; 96 (11),  
pp. 1482-1498.
[26] Hollnagel, E., Fujita, Y. The 
Fukushima disaster-systemic failures 
as the lack of resilience. Nuclear 
Engineering and Technology, 2013; 45 
(1), pp. 13-20.
[27] Tveiten, C.K. Resilient planning 
of modification projects in high risk 
systems: The implications of using the 
functional resonance analysis method 
for risk assessments. Oil and Gas, 
Technology and Humans: Assessing 
the Human Factors of Technological 
Change, 2013; pp. 147-168.
[28] Haavik, T.K. On the ontology of 
safety. Safety Science, 2014;67,  
pp. 37-43.
[29] Praetorius, G., Hollnagel, E., 
Dahlman, J. Modelling Vessel Traffic 
Service to understand resilience 
in everyday operations. Reliability 
Engineering and System Safety, 215; 
141, pp. 10-21.
[30] Melanson, A., Nadeau, S. Managing 
OHS in complex and unpredictable 
manufacturing systems: Can FRAM 
bring agility? Advances in Intelligent 
Systems and Computing, 2016; 490,  
pp. 341-348.
[31] Saaty, T.L. Applications of 
analytical hierarchies. Mathematics and 
Computers in Simulation, 1979; 21(1), 
pp. 1-20.
[32] Saaty, T.L. A scaling method for 
priorities in hierarchical structures. 
15
The Analytic Functional Resonance Analysis to Improve Safety Management
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.93998
Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 
1977; 15(3), pp. 234-281.
[33] Saaty, T.L. How to structure and 
make choices in complex problems 
Human Systems Management, 1982; 
3(4), pp. 256-261.
[34] Saaty, T.L. Introduction to a 
modeling of social decision processes. 
Mathematics and Computers in 
Simulation, 1983; 25(2), pp. 105-107.
[35] De Felice, F., Deldoost, M.H., 
Faizollahi, M., Petrillo, A. Performance 
measurement model for the supplier 
selection based on AHP. International 
Journal of Engineering Business 
Management, 2015; 7, pp. 1-13.
[36] Saaty, T.L Eigenvector and 
logarithmic least squares European 
Journal of Operational Research, 1990; 
48(1), pp. 156-160.
